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Abstract
Randomness extraction involves the processing of purely classical in-
formation and is therefore usually studied in the framework of classical
probability theory. However, such a classical treatment is generally too
restrictive for applications where side information about the values taken
by classical random variables may be represented by the state of a quan-
tum system. This is particularly relevant in the context of cryptography,
where an adversary may make use of quantum devices. Here, we show
that the well known construction paradigm for extractors proposed by
Trevisan is sound in the presence of quantum side information.
We exploit the modularity of this paradigm to give several concrete
extractor constructions, which, e.g., extract all the conditional (smooth)
min-entropy of the source using a seed of length poly-logarithmic in the
input, or only require the seed to be weakly random.
1 Introduction
Randomness extraction is the art of generating (almost) uniform randomness
from any weakly random source X . More precisely, a randomness extractor
(or, simply extractor) is a function Ext that takes as input X together with a
uniformly distributed (and usually short) string Y , called the seed, and outputs
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a string Z. One then requires Z to be almost uniformly distributed whenever
the min-entropy of X is larger than some threshold k, i.e.,
Hmin(X) ≥ k =⇒ Z := Ext(X,Y ) statistically close to uniform. (1)
The min-entropy of a random variable X is directly related to the probability
of correctly guessing the value of X using an optimal strategy: 2−Hmin(X) =
maxx PX(x). Hence Criterion (1) can be interpreted operationally: if the maxi-
mum probability of successfully guessing the input of the extractor, X , is suffi-
ciently low then its output is statistically close to uniform.
The randomness of a value X always depends on the information one has
about it, in the following called side information. In cryptography, for instance,
a key is supposed to be uniformly random from the point of view of an adversary,
who may have access to messages exchanged by the honest parties, which we
would therefore consider as side information. Here, extractors are typically used
for privacy amplification [BBR88,BBCM95], i.e., to turn a partially secure raw
key (about which the adversary may have non-trivial information) into a per-
fectly secure key. We thus demand that the extractor output be uniform with
respect to the side information held by the adversary. Another example is ran-
domness recycling in a computation, which can be done using extractors [IZ89].
The aim is that the recycled randomness be independent of the outputs of pre-
vious computations, which are therefore considered as side information.
In the following, we make side information explicit and denote it by E. The
notions of randomness we are going to use, such as the guessing probability,
min-entropy or the uniformity of a random variable, must then be defined with
respect to E. We can naturally reformulate Criterion (1) as
Hmin(X |E) ≥ k =⇒ Z := Ext(X,Y ) statistically close to uniform (2)
conditioned on E,
whereHmin(X |E) is the conditional min-entropy, formally defined in Section 2.2.
This conditioning naturally extends the operational interpretation of the min-
entropy to scenarios with explicit side information, i.e., 2−Hmin(X|E) is the
maximum probability of correctly guessing X , given access to side information
E [KRS09].
Interestingly, the relationship between the two Criteria (1) and (2) depends
on the physical nature of the side information E, i.e., whether E is represented
by the state of a classical or a quantum system. In the case of purely classical side
information, E may be modeled as a random variable and it is known that the
two criteria are essentially equivalent (see Lemma 3.3 for a precise statement).
But in the general case where E is a quantum system, Criterion (2) is strictly
stronger than (1): it was shown in [GKK+07] that there exist extractors that
fulfill (1) but for which (2) fails (see also [KR11] for a discussion).
Since our world is inherently non-classical, it is of particular importance
that (2) rather than the weaker Criterion (1) be taken as the relevant criterion
for the definition of extractors. In cryptography, for instance, there is generally
nothing that prevents an adversary from holding quantum side information. In
fact, even if a cryptographic scheme is purely classical, an adversary may acquire
information using a non-classical attack strategy. Hence, when using extractors
for privacy amplification, Criterion (1) does not generally imply security. A
similar situation may arise in the context of randomness recycling. If we run
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a (simulation of) a quantum system E using randomness X , approximately
Hmin(X |E) bits of X can be reused. If we now, in an attempt to recycle the
randomness, apply a function Ext which fulfills (1) but not (2), the output Z
may still be correlated to the system E.
It is known that the conditional min-entropy accurately characterizes the
maximum amount of uniform randomness that can be extracted from X while
being independent from E. (More precisely, the smooth conditional min-entropy,
an entropy measure derived from Hmin(X |E) by maximizing the latter over
all states in an ε-neighborhood, is an upper bound on the amount of uniform
randomness that can be extracted; see Section 2.2 and [Ren05] for details).
In other words, the characterization of extractors in terms of Hmin(X |E) is
essentially optimal, and one may thus argue that Criterion (2) is indeed the
correct definition for randomness extraction (see also [Ren05,KR11,KT08]). In
this work, we follow this line of argument and call an extractor quantum-proof
if it satisfies Criterion (2) (see Section 3.1).
We note that there have been alternative proposals in the literature for defin-
ing extractors in the context of quantum side information, which do however not
satisfy the above optimality condition. One prominent example is the bounded
storage model (see Section 5.3), where the (quantum) side information E is char-
acterized by the number of qubits, H0(E), required to store it. In this model,
the entropy Hmin(X |E) of a source X conditioned on E is lower-bounded by
Hmin(X)−H0(E). However, this characterization of side information is strictly
weaker than that using Hmin(X |E): there are sources X and nontrivial side
information E such that Hmin(X)−H0(E)≪ Hmin(X |E).1 In particular, even
if an extractor can provably extract Hmin(X) − H0(E) bits of uniform (with
respect to E) randomness from a source X , we do not know whether the same
extractor can attain the optimal Hmin(X |E) bits. Note also that the same
considerations apply to the purely classical case. In fact, no recent work de-
fines classical extractors for randomness sources with side information stored in
bounded classical memories.2
Finally we remark that the increased generality attained by the notion of
quantum-proof extractors used here is crucial for applications. For example
in quantum key distribution, where extractors are used for privacy amplifica-
tion [Ren05], it is generally impossible to bound the adversary’s memory size.
1.1 Related results
In the standard literature on randomness extraction, constructions of extrac-
tors are usually shown to fulfill Criterion (1), for certain values of the thresh-
old k (see [Zuc90] as well as [Sha02] for an overview). However, only a few
constructions have been shown to fulfill Criterion (2) with arbitrary quantum
side information E. Among them is two-universal hashing [Ren05, TSSR10],
1This can easily be seen by considering the following example. Let X be uniformly dis-
tributed on {0, 1}n and E be X with each bit flipped with constant probability ε < 1/2. Then
Hmin(X|E) = Θ(n), but Hmin(X)−H0(E) = 0.
2Restricting the class of randomness sources further than by bounding their min-entropy
can have advantages. For example, if we consider only bit-fixing sources, or sources generated
by a random walk on a Markov chain, then the extractor can be deterministic. (See [Sha02]
for a brief overview of restricted families of sources studied in the literature.) There is however
no known advantage (e.g., in terms of seed length) in considering only input sources with side
information stored in a memory of bounded size, whether it is classical or quantum.
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constructions based on the sample-and-hash approach [KR11], as well as all
extractors with one-bit output [KT08].
Recently, Ta-Shma [TS09] studied Trevisan’s [Tre01] construction of extrac-
tors in the bounded quantum storage model. The result was a breakthrough
because it, for the first time, implied the existence of quantum-proof extractors
requiring only short seeds (logarithmic in the input length). Unfortunately, Ta-
Shma’s result is proved in the bounded quantum storage model. More precisely,
he requires the output length to be much smaller than the min-entropy of the
original data: it scales as (Hmin(X)/H0(E))
1/c, where c > 1 is a constant.
Subsequent to this work, Ben-Aroya and Ta-Shma [BATS12] showed how
two versions of Trevisan’s extractor, shown quantum-proof in this paper, can be
combined to extract a constant fraction of the min-entropy of an n-bit source
with a seed of length O(log n), when Hmin(X |E) > n/2. This is better than the
straightforward application of Trevisan’s extractor analyzed here, which requires
O(log2 n) bits of seed for the same output size (but works for any Hmin(X |E)).
1.2 Our contribution
In this work, we show that the performance of Trevisan’s extractor does not
suffer in the presence of quantum side information. This improves on the best
previously known result [TS09] in two major ways. First, we prove our results
in the most general model, where the min-entropy of the source is measured
relative to quantum side information (Criterion (2)). Second, we show that
the output length of the extractor can be close to the optimal conditional min-
entropyHmin(X |E) (see Corollary 5.4 for the exact parameters).3 This provides
the first proof of soundness for an extractor with poly-logarithmic seed meeting
Criterion (2) in the presence of arbitrary quantum side information.
More generally, we show that a whole class of extractors is quantum-proof.
It has been observed, by, e.g., Lu [Lu04] and Vadhan [Vad04], that Trevisan’s
extractor [Tre01] (and variations of it, such as [RRV02]) can be seen as a con-
catenation of the outputs of a one-bit extractor with different pseudo-random
seeds. Since the proof of the extractor property is independent of the type of the
underlying one-bit extractor (and to some extent the construction of the pseudo-
random seeds), our result is valid for a generic scheme (defined in Section 4.1,
Definition 4.2). We find that the performance of this generic scheme in the
context of quantum side information (Section 4.2.1, Theorem 4.6) is roughly
equivalent to the (known) case of purely classical side information [RRV02].
In practical situations where quantum-proof extractors are used, e.g., privacy
amplification in quantum key distribution [Ren05], the players do not necessarily
have access to a uniform source of randomness. We therefore analyze separately
the situation where the seed is only weakly random, and show that Trevisan’s
extractor is quantum-proof in that setting as well (Section 4.2.2, Theorem 4.7).
By “plugging” various one-bit extractors and pseudo-random seeds into the
generic scheme, we obtain different final constructions, optimized for different
needs, e.g., maximizing the output length, minimizing the seed, or using a non-
uniform seed. In Table 1 we give a brief overview of the final constructions
proposed.
3In the conference version of this paper [DV10], two of us showed that a similar result
could be obtained in the more restricted bounded-storage model.
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Min-entropy Output length Seed length Note
Cor. 5.4 any k m = k − 4 log 1/ε d = O(log3 n) optimized out-
put length
Cor. 5.6 k = nα m = nα−γ d = O(log n) optimized
seed length
Cor. 5.11 k = αn m = (α− γ)n d = O(log2 n) local extractor
Cor. 5.14 k = nα m = nα−γ d = O(log n) seed with min-
entropy βd
Table 1 – Plugging various weak designs and 1-bit extractors in Trevisan’s
construction, we obtain these concrete extractors. Here n is the input length,
ε = poly(1/n) the error, α and γ are arbitrary constants such that 0 < γ < α ≤ 1,
and 1
2
< β < 1 is a specific constant.
1.3 Proof technique
The proof proceeds by contradiction. We first assume that a player holding
the side information E can distinguish the output from uniform with proba-
bility greater than ε. We then show that such a player can reconstruct the
input X with high probability, which means that X must have low min-entropy
(Hmin(X |E) < k). Taking the contrapositive proves that the extractor is sound.
Trevisan [Tre01] originally proved the soundness of his extractor this way.
His construction starts by encoding the source X using a list-decodable code
C. The output of the extractor then consists of certain bits of C(X), which are
specified by the seed and a construction called a (weak) design [NW94,RRV02].
(See Section 4.1 for a precise description of Trevisan’s extractor.) His proof
can then be broken down in two steps. He first shows that a player who can
distinguish the output from uniform can guess a random bit of C(X). In the
second step, he shows that such a player can reconstruct X .
Proving the soundness of Trevisan’s extractor in the quantum min-entropy
framework requires some important changes. In order to better explain these
new elements, it will be useful to first give a brief overview of the main steps
that go into Ta-Shma’s proof [TS09]. For the sake of contradiction, assume
that there is a test T which performs a measurement on the side information
E in order to distinguish the output from uniform with advantage ε. Using
a standard hybrid argument, along with properties of the (weak) design, one
can then construct a new test T ′ (using a little extra classical advice about X)
which predicts a random bit of C(X) with probability 12 +
ε
m , where m is the
number of output bits. Further, T ′ makes exactly one query to T .
The proof in [TS09] proceeds by showing how from such a test, one can
construct another test T ′′ which predicts any bit of X with probability 0.99
and queries T ′ at most q = (m/ε)c times (c = 15 for the code in [TS09]). This
gives a random access code (RAC) [ANTSV99] for X ; however, since it requires
q queries to the side information E, the no-cloning theorem forces us to see
it as querying a single system of length qH0(E) (recall that Ta-Shma’s result
was proved in the bounded storage model, where one bounds the information
provided by E by its number of qubits H0(E)). Finally, using a new bound
on the dimension of RACs [TS09], one finds that Hmin(X) & m
cH0(E), hence
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m . (Hmin(X)/H0(E))
1/c, where for simplicity we have taken the error ε to be
a constant.
Our proof improves upon Ta-Shma’s through two major changes. First, we
model the side information E explicitly, instead of viewing it as an oracle which
one queries. Indeed, the measurement performed by the test T ′ to predict
the bits of C(X) will be different from the measurement performed by T ′′ to
reconstruct X , and this cannot be captured by the “oracle side-information”
model of Ta-Shma. We thus show (in Section 4.2, Proposition 4.4) that if the
output of the extractor can be distinguished from uniform with probability 12+ε
by a player holding the side information E, then the bits of C(X) can be guessed
with probability 12 +
ε
m by a player holding E and some extra small classical
information G.
Second, we depart from the reconstruction paradigm at the heart of the
second half of the proof of both Trevisan’s and Ta-Shma’s results. Instead of
defining explicitly the measurement and computation necessary to reconstruct
X , we use the fact that for any list-decodable code C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n¯, the
function
C′ : {0, 1}n × [n¯]→ {0, 1}
(x, i) 7→ C(x)i
is a one-bit extractor according to Criterion (1) (see Appendix C for more de-
tails). It was however proved by Ko¨nig and Terhal [KT08], that in the one-
bit setting the more general Criterion (2) is essentially equivalent to the usual
Criterion (1). This result lets us conclude directly that the input X must have
low min-entropy relative to the quantum side information E.
This proof structure results in a very modular extractor construction par-
adigm, which allows arbitrary one-bit extractors and pseudo-random seeds to
be plugged in, producing many different final constructions, some of which are
given in Table 1 and detailed in Section 5.
1.4 Organization of the paper
We first define the necessary technical tools in Section 2, in particular the con-
ditional min-entropy. In Section 3 we give formal definitions of extractors and
discuss how much randomness can be extracted from a given source. Section 4
contains the description of Trevisan’s extractor construction paradigm and our
main result: a proof that this construction paradigm is sound in the presence
of quantum side information, in the cases of both uniform and weakly random
seeds. Then in Section 5 we plug into Trevisan’s construction various one-bit
extractors and pseudo-random seed constructions, resulting in various different
extractors. For example, Section 5.1 contains a construction which is nearly opti-
mal in the amount of randomness extracted (which is identical to the best known
bound in the classical case [RRV02] for Trevisan’s extractor), and Section 5.4
gives an extractor which is still sound if there is a small linear entropy loss in
the seed. Finally, in Section 6, we give a brief outlook on further work. In
particular, we mention a few classical results which modify and improve Tre-
visan’s extractor, but for which the soundness in the presence of quantum side
information does not seem to follow immediately from this work.
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The appendix contains many technical sections and lemmas which are not
essential for understanding Trevisan’s extractor, but are nonetheless an impor-
tant part of the construction and proof. Appendix A develops a bit more the
general theory of extractors: it contains two subsections which, respectively, de-
fine extractors for weakly random seeds and show how to compose extractors
to obtain more randomness from the same source. In Appendix B we state sev-
eral technical lemmas: min-entropy chain rules and the details of the reduction
from Trevisan’s construction to the underlying one-bit extractor. Finally, in
Appendix C we give a proof that list-decodable codes are one-bit extractors.
2 Technical preliminaries
2.1 Notation
We write [N ] for the set of integers {1, . . . , N}. If x ∈ {0, 1}n is a string of
length n, i ∈ [n] an integer, and S ⊆ [n] a set of integers, we write xi for the ith
bit of x, and xS for the string formed by the bits of x at the positions given by
the elements of S.
H always denotes a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. We denote by P(H)
the set of positive semi-definite operators on H. We define the set of normalized
quantum states S(H) := {ρ ∈ P(H) : tr ρ = 1} and the set of sub-normalized
quantum states S≤(H) := {ρ ∈ P(H) : tr ρ ≤ 1}.
We write HAB = HA ⊗ HB for a bipartite quantum system and ρAB ∈
P(HAB) for a bipartite quantum state. ρA = trB(ρAB) and ρB = trA(ρAB)
denote the corresponding reduced density operators.
If a classical random variable X takes the value x ∈ X with probability px,
it can be represented by the state ρX =
∑
x∈X px|x〉〈x|, where {|x〉}x∈X is an
orthonormal basis of a Hilbert space HX . If the classical system X is part of
a composite system XB, any state of that composite system can be written as
ρXB =
∑
x∈X px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB.
‖ · ‖tr denotes the trace norm and is defined by ‖A‖tr := tr
√
A†A.
2.2 Min-entropy
To measure how much randomness a source contains and can be extracted, we
need to use the smooth conditional min-entropy. This entropy measure was first
defined by Renner [Ren05], and represents the optimal measure for randomness
extraction in the sense that it is always possible to extract that amount of
almost-uniform randomness from a source, but never more. Before defining this
notion, we first state a non-smooth version.
Definition 2.1 (conditional min-entropy [Ren05]). Let ρAB ∈ S≤(HAB). The
min-entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
Hmin (A|B)ρ := max{λ ∈ R : ∃σB ∈ S(HB) s.t. 2−λ1A ⊗ σB ≥ ρAB}.
We will often drop the subscript ρ when there is no doubt about what un-
derlying state is meant.
This definition has a simple operational interpretation when the first system
is classical, which is the case we consider. Ko¨nig et al. [KRS09] showed that for
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a state ρXB =
∑
x∈X px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB classical on X ,
Hmin (X |B)ρ = − log pguess (X |B)ρ , (3)
where pguess(X |B) is the maximum probability of guessing X given B, namely
pguess (X |B)ρ := max{Ex
B
}x∈X
(∑
x∈X
px tr (E
x
Bρ
x
B)
)
,
where the maximum is taken over all POVMs {ExB}x∈X on B. If the system
B is empty, then the min-entropy of X reduces to the Renyi entropy of order
infinity, Hmin(X) = − logmaxx∈X px (sometimes written H∞(X)). In this case
the connection to the guessing probability is particularly obvious: when no side
information is available, the best guess we can make is simply the value x ∈ X
with highest probability.
The smooth min-entropy then consists in maximizing the min-entropy over
all sub-normalized states ε-close to the actual state ρXB of the system consid-
ered. Thus by introducing an extra error ε, we have a state with potentially
much more entropy. (See Section 3.2 for more details.)
Definition 2.2 (smooth min-entropy [Ren05,TCR10]). Let ε ≥ 0 and ρAB ∈
S≤(HAB), then the ε-smooth min-entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
Hεmin (A|B)ρ := max
ρ˜AB∈Bε(ρAB)
Hmin (A|B)ρ˜ ,
where Bε(ρAB) ⊆ S≤(HAB) is a ball of sub-normalized states of radius ε around
ρAB.
4
3 Extractors
3.1 Extractors, side information, and privacy amplifica-
tion
An extractor Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a function which takes a weak
source of randomness X and a uniformly random, short seed Y , and produces
some output Ext(X,Y ), which is almost uniform. The extractor is said to be
strong, if the output is approximately independent of the seed.
Definition 3.1 (strong extractor [NZ96]). A function Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d →
{0, 1}m is a (k, ε)-strong extractor with uniform seed, if for all distributions X
with min-entropy Hmin(X) ≥ k and a uniform seed Y , we have5
1
2
∥∥ρExt(X,Y )Y − ρUm ⊗ ρY ∥∥tr ≤ ε,
4The distance measure used in this definition is the purified distance [TCR10], P (ρ, σ) :=√
1− F (ρ, σ)2, where F (·, ·) is the fidelity. The only property of the purified distance we need
in this work is that it upper bounds the trace distance, i.e., P (ρ, σ) ≥ 1
2
‖ρ − σ‖tr. We refer
to [TCR10] for a formal definition of the purified distance (and fidelity) on sub-normalized
states and a discussion of its advantages.
5A more standard classical notation would be 1
2
‖Ext(X, Y ) ◦ Y − Um ◦ Y ‖ ≤ ε, where the
distance metric is the variational distance. However, since classical random variables can be
represented by quantum states diagonal in the computational basis, and the trace distance
reduces to the variational distance, we use the quantum notation for compatibility with the
rest of this work.
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where ρUm is the fully mixed state on a system of dimension 2
m.
Using the connection between min-entropy and guessing probability (Eq. (3)),
a (k, ε)-strong extractor can be seen as a function which guarantees that if the
guessing probability of X is not too high (pguess(X) ≤ 2−k), then it produces
a random variable which is approximately uniform and independent from the
seed Y .
As discussed in the introduction, we consider here a more general situation
involving side information, denoted by E, which may be represented by the
state of a quantum system. A function Ext is then an extractor if, when the
probability of guessing X given E is not too high, Ext can produce a random
variable Ext(X,Y ) which is approximately uniform and independent from the
seed Y and the side information E. Equivalently, one may think of a privacy
amplification scenario [BBR88,BBCM95], where E is the information available
to an adversary and where the goal is to turn weakly secret data X into a
secret key Ext(X,Y ), where the seed Y is assumed to be public. (In typical key
agreement protocols, the seed is chosen by the legitimate parties and exchanged
over public channels.)
The following definition covers the general situation where the side informa-
tion E may be represented quantum-mechanically. The case of purely classical
side information is then formulated as a restriction on the nature of E.
Definition 3.2 (quantum-proof strong extractor [KR11, Section 2.6]). A func-
tion Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a quantum-proof (or simply quantum)
(k, ε)-strong extractor with uniform seed, if for all states ρXE classical on X with
Hmin(X |E)ρ ≥ k, and for a uniform seed Y , we have6
1
2
∥∥ρExt(X,Y )Y E − ρUm ⊗ ρY ⊗ ρE∥∥tr ≤ ε, (4)
where ρUm is the fully mixed state on a system of dimension 2
m.
The function Ext is a classical-proof (k, ε)-strong extractor with uniform seed
if the same holds with the system E restricted to classical states.
It turns out that if the system E is restricted to classical information about
X , then this definition is essentially equivalent to the conventional Definition 3.1.
Lemma 3.3 ( [KR11, Section 2.5], [KT08, Proposition 1]). Any (k, ε)-strong
extractor is a classical-proof (k + log 1/ε, 2ε)-strong extractor.
However, if the system E is quantum, this does not necessarily hold. Gavin-
sky et al. [GKK+07] give an example of a (k, ε)-strong extractor, which breaks
down in the presence of quantum side information, even when Hmin(X |E) is
significantly larger than k.
Remark 3.4. In this section we defined extractors with a uniform seed, as this
is the most common way of defining them. Instead one could use a seed which
is only weakly random, but require it to have a min-entropy larger than a given
threshold, Hmin(Y ) ≥ s. The seed must still be independent from the input and
6 [TSSR10] substitute ∃σY E s.t.
1
2
‖ρExt(X,Y )Y E − ρUm ⊗ σY E‖tr ≤ ε for Eq. (4). This
results in a weaker definition, which does not offer the same composability guarantees. In
particular, Lemma A.4 does not hold with the same parameters when extractors are defined
as in [TSSR10].
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the side information. Since having access to a uniform seed is often an unrealistic
assumption, it is much more useful for practical applications to define and prove
the soundness of extractors with a weakly random seed. We redefine extractors
formally this way in Appendix A.1, and show in Section 4.2.2 that Trevisan’s
extractor is still quantum-proof in this setting.
All the considerations of this section, in particular Lemma 3.3 and the gap
between classical and quantum side-information, also apply if the seed is only
weakly random. In the following, when we talk about a strong extractors with-
out specifying the nature of the seed, we are referring to both uniform seeded
and weakly random seeded extractors.
3.2 Extracting more randomness
Radhakrishnan and Ta-Shma [RTS00] have shown that a (k, ε)-strong extractor
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m will necessarily have
m ≤ k − 2 log 1/ε+O(1). (5)
However, in some situations we can extract much more randomness than the min-
entropy. For example, let X be distributed on {0, 1}n with Pr[X = x0] = 1/n
and for all x 6= x0, Pr[X = x] = n−1n(2n−1) . We have Hmin(X) = logn, so using a
(log n, 1/n)-strong extractor we could obtain at most log n bits of randomness.
But X is already 1/n-close to uniform, since 12‖ρX −ρUn‖tr ≤ 1n . So we already
have n bits of nearly uniform randomness, exponentially more than the min-
entropy suggests.
In the case of quantum extractors, similar examples can be found, e.g.,
in [TCR10, Remark 22]. However, an upper bound on the extractable ran-
domness can be obtained by replacing the min-entropy by the smooth min-
entropy (Definition 2.2). More precisely, the total number of ε-uniform bits
that can be extracted in the presence of side information E can never exceed
Hεmin(X |E) [Ren05, Section 5.6].
Conversely, the next lemma implies that an extractor which is known to
extract m bits from any source such that Hmin(X |E) ≥ k can in fact extract
the same number of bits, albeit with a slightly larger error, from sources which
only satisfy Hε
′
min(X |E) ≥ k, a much weaker requirement in some cases.
Lemma 3.5. If Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a quantum-proof (k, ε)-
strong extractor, then for any state ρXE and any ε
′ > 0 with Hε
′
min(X |E)ρ ≥ k,
1
2
∥∥ρExt(X,Y )Y E − ρUm ⊗ ρY ⊗ ρE∥∥tr ≤ ε+ 2ε′.
Proof. Let ρ˜XE be the state ε
′-close to ρXE for which Hmin(X |E)ρ˜ reaches its
maximum. Then
1
2
∥∥ρExt(X,Y )Y E − ρUm ⊗ ρY ⊗ ρE∥∥tr
≤ 1
2
∥∥ρExt(X,Y )Y E − ρ˜Ext(X,Y )Y E∥∥tr + 12
∥∥ρ˜Ext(X,Y )Y E − ρUm ⊗ ρY ⊗ ρ˜E∥∥tr
+
1
2
‖ρUm ⊗ ρY ⊗ ρ˜E − ρUm ⊗ ρY ⊗ ρE‖tr
≤ 1
2
∥∥ρ˜Ext(X,Y )Y E − ρUm ⊗ ρY ⊗ ρ˜E∥∥tr + ‖ρXE − ρ˜XE‖tr
≤ ε+ 2ε′.
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In the second inequality above we used twice the fact that a trace-preserving
quantum operation can only decrease the trace distance. And in the last line
we used the fact that the purified distance — used in the smooth min-entropy
definition (Definition 2.2) — upper bounds the trace distance.
Remark 3.6. Since a (k, ε)-strong extractor can be applied to any source with
smooth min-entropy Hε
′
min(X |E) ≥ k, we can measure the entropy loss of the
extractor — namely how much entropy was not extracted — with
∆ := k −m,
where m is the size of the output. From Eq. (5) we know that an extractor has
optimal entropy loss if ∆ = 2 log 1/ε+O(1).
4 Constructing m-bit extractors from one-bit
extractors and weak designs
In this section we prove our main result: we show that Trevisan’s extractor
paradigm [Tre01] — which shows how to construct an m-bit extractor from any
(classical) 1-bit strong extractor — is sound in the presence of quantum side
information.
This construction paradigm can be seen as a derandomization of the simple
concatenation of the outputs of a 1-bit extractor applied m times to the same
input with different (independent) seeds. The construction with independent
seeds needs a total seed of length d = mt, where t is the length of the seed
of the 1-bit extractor. Trevisan [Tre01] shows how to do this using only d =
poly(t, logm) bits of seed, and proves it is sound when no side information is
present.7 We combine a combinatorial construction called weak designs by Raz
et al. [RRV02], which they use to improve Trevisan’s extractor, and a previous
observation by two of the authors [DV10], that since 1-bit extractors were shown
to be quantum-proof by by Ko¨nig and Terhal [KT08], Trevisan’s extractor is
also quantum-proof.
This results in a generic scheme, which can be based on any weak design
and 1-bit strong extractor. We define it in Section 4.1, then prove bounds on
the min-entropy and error in Section 4.2.
4.1 Description of Trevisan’s construction
In order to shorten the seed while still outputting m bits, in Trevisan’s extractor
construction paradigm the seed is treated as a string of length d < mt, which is
then split in m overlapping blocks of t bits, each of which is used as a (different)
seed for the 1-bit extractor. Let y ∈ {0, 1}d be the total seed. To specify the
seeds for each application of the 1-bit extractor we need m sets S1, · · · , Sm ⊂ [d]
of size |Si| = t for all i. The seeds for the different runs of the 1-bit extractor
are then given by ySi , namely the bits of y at the positions specified by the
elements of Si.
7Trevisan’s original paper does not explicitly define his extractor as a pseudo-random
concatenation of a 1-bit extractor. It has however been noted in, e.g., [Lu04,Vad04], that this
is basically what Trevisan’s extractor does.
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The seeds for the different outputs of the 1-bit extractor must however be
nearly independent. To achieve this, Nisan and Wigderson [NW94] proposed to
minimize the overlap |Si ∩ Sj| between the sets, and Trevisan used this idea in
his original work [Tre01]. Raz et al. [RRV02] improved this, showing that it is
sufficient for these sets to meet the conditions of a weak design.8
Definition 4.1 (weak design [RRV02]). A family of sets S1, . . . , Sm ⊂ [d] is a
weak (t, r)-design if
1. For all i, |Si| = t.
2. For all i,
∑i−1
j=1 2
|Sj∩Si| ≤ rm.
We can now describe Trevisan’s generic extractor construction.
Definition 4.2 (Trevisan’s extractor [Tre01]). For a one-bit extractor C :
{0, 1}n×{0, 1}t → {0, 1}, which uses a (not necessarily uniform) seed of length
t, and for a weak (t, r)-design S1, . . . , Sm ⊂ [d], we define the m-bit extractor
ExtC : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m as
ExtC(x, y) := C(x, yS1) · · ·C(x, ySm).
Remark 4.3. The length of the seed of the extractor ExtC is d, one of the
parameters of the weak design, which in turn depends on t, the size of the seed of
the 1-bit extractor C. In Section 5 we will give concrete instantiations of weak
designs and 1-bit extractors, achieving various entropy losses and seed sizes.
The size of the seed will always be d = poly(log n), if the error is ε = poly(1/n).
For example, to achieve a near optimal entropy loss (Section 5.1), we need
d = O(t2 logm) and t = O(log n), hence d = O(log3 n).
4.2 Analysis
We now prove that the extractor defined in the previous section is a quantum-
proof strong extractor. The first step follows the structure of the classical
proof [Tre01, RRV02]. We show that a player holding the side information
and who can distinguish the output of the extractor ExtC from uniform can —
given a little extra information — distinguish the output of the underlying 1-bit
extractor C from uniform. This is summed up in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.4. Let X be a classical random variable correlated to some quan-
tum system E, let Y be a (not necessarily uniform) seed, independent from XE,
and let ∥∥ρExtC(X,Y )Y E − ρUm ⊗ ρY ⊗ ρE∥∥tr > ε, (6)
where ExtC is the extractor from Definition 4.2. Then there exists a fixed parti-
tion of the seed Y in two substrings V and W , and a classical random variable
G, such that G has size H0(G) ≤ rm, where r is one of the parameters of the
weak design (Definition 4.1), V ↔W ↔ G form a Markov chain,9 and∥∥ρC(X,V )VWGE − ρU1 ⊗ ρVWGE∥∥tr > εm. (7)
8The second condition of the weak design was originally defined as
∑i−1
j=1 2
|Sj∩Si| ≤ r(m−
1). We prefer to use the version of [HR03], since it simplifies the notation without changing
the design constructions.
9Three random variables are said to form a Markov chain X ↔ Y ↔ Z if for all x, y, z we
have PZ|YX(z|y, x) = PZ|Y (z|y), or equivalently PZX|Y (z, x|y) = PZ|Y (z|y)PX|Y (x|y).
12
We provide a proof of Proposition 4.4 in Appendix B.2, where it is restated
as Proposition B.5.10
For readers familiar with Trevisan’s scheme [Tre01,RRV02], we briefly sketch
the correspondence between the variables of Proposition 4.4 and quantities an-
alyzed in Trevisan’s construction. Trevisan’s proof proceeds by assuming by
contradiction that there exists a player, holding E, who can distinguish be-
tween the output of the extractor and the uniform distribution (Eq. (6)). Part
of the seed is then fixed (this corresponds to W in the above statement) and
some classical advice is taken (this corresponds to G in the above statement) to
construct another player who can distinguish a specific bit of the output from
uniform. But since a specific bit of Trevisan’s extractor is just the underlying 1-
bit extractor applied to a substring of the seed (V in the above statement), this
new player (who holds WGE) can distinguish the output of the 1-bit extractor
from uniform (Eq. (7)).
In the classical case Proposition 4.4 would be sufficient to prove the sound-
ness of Trevisan’s scheme, since it shows that if a player can distinguish ExtC
from uniform, then he can distinguish C from uniform given a few extra advice
bits, which contradicts the assumption that C is an extractor.11 But since our
assumption is that the underlying 1-bit extractor is only classical-proof, we still
need to show that the quantum player who can distinguish C(X,V ) from uni-
form is not more powerful than a classical player, and so if he can distinguish the
output of C from uniform, so can a classical player. This has already been done
by Ko¨nig and Terhal [KT08], who show that 1-bit extractors are quantum-proof.
Theorem 4.5 ( [KT08, Theorem III.1]). Let C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1} be
a (k, ε)-strong extractor. Then C is a quantum-proof (k + log 1/ε, 3
√
ε)-strong
extractor.12
We now need to put Proposition 4.4 and Theorem 4.5 together to prove that
Trevisan’s extractor is quantum-proof. The cases of uniform and weak random
seeds differ somewhat in the details. We therefore give two separate proofs for
these two cases in Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Uniform seed
We show that Trevisan’s extractor is a quantum-proof strong extractor with
uniform seed with the following parameters.
Theorem 4.6. Let C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1} be a (k, ε)-strong extractor
with uniform seed and S1, . . . , Sm ⊂ [d] a weak (t, r)-design. Then the extractor
given in Definition 4.2, ExtC : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, is a quantum-proof
(k + rm+ log 1/ε, 3m
√
ε)-strong extractor.
Proof. In Proposition 4.4, if the seed Y is uniform, then V is independent from
W and hence by the Markov chain property from G as well, so Eq. (7) can be
10Note that Ta-Shma [TS09] has already implicitly proved that this proposition must hold
in the presence of quantum side information, by arguing that the side information can be
viewed as an oracle. The present statement is a strict generalization of that reasoning, which
allows conditional min-entropy as well as non-uniform seeds to be used.
11In the classical case, [Tre01,RRV02] still show that a player who can distinguish C(X, V )
from uniform can reconstruct X with high probability. But this is nothing else than proving
that C is an extractor.
12This result holds whether the seed is uniform or not.
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rewritten as ∥∥ρC(X,V )VWGE − ρU1 ⊗ ρV ⊗ ρWGE∥∥tr > εm,
which corresponds to the exact criterion of the definition of a quantum-proof
extractor.
Let C be a (k, ε)-strong extractor with uniform seed, and assume that a
player holds a system E such that∥∥ρExtC(X,Y )Y E − ρUm ⊗ ρY ⊗ ρE∥∥tr > 3m√ε.
Then by Proposition 4.4 and because Y is uniform, we know that there exists
a classical system G with H0(G) ≤ rm, and a partition of Y in V and W , such
that, ∥∥ρC(X,V )VWGE − ρU1 ⊗ ρV ⊗ ρWGE∥∥tr > 3√ε. (8)
Since C is a (k, ε)-strong extractor, we know from Theorem 4.5 that we must
have Hmin(X |WGE) < k + log 1/ε for Eq. (8) to hold. Hence by Lemma B.3,
Hmin(X |E) = Hmin(X |WE) ≤ Hmin(X |WGE)+H0(G) < k+rm+log 1/ε.
4.2.2 Weak random seed
We show that Trevisan’s extractor is a quantum-proof strong extractor with
weak random seed, with the following parameters.
Theorem 4.7. Let C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1} be a (k, ε)-strong extractor
with an s-bit seed — i.e., the seed needs at least s bits of min-entropy — and
S1, . . . , Sm ⊂ [d] a weak (t, r)-design. Then the extractor given in Definition 4.2,
ExtC : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, is a quantum-proof (k+rm+log 1/ε, 6m
√
ε)-
strong extractor for any seed with min-entropy d− (t− s− log 1
3
√
ε
).
The main difference between this proof and that of Theorem 4.6, is that
since the seed Y is not uniform in Proposition 4.4, the substring W of the seed
not used by the 1-bit extractor C is correlated to the seed V of C, and acts as
classical side information about the seed. To handle this, we show in Lemma A.3
that with probability 1 − ε over the values of W , V still contains a lot of min-
entropy, roughly s′ − d′, where d′ is the length of W and s′ is the min-entropy
of Y . And hence a player holding WGE can distinguish the output of C from
uniform, even though the seed has enough min-entropy.
Proof. Let C be a (k, ε)-strong extractor with s bits of min-entropy in the seed,
and assume that a player holds a system E such that∥∥ρExtC(X,Y )Y E − ρUm ⊗ ρY ⊗ ρE∥∥tr > 6m√ε.
Then by Proposition 4.4 we have∥∥ρC(X,V )VWGE − ρU1 ⊗ ρVWGE∥∥tr > 6√ε. (9)
Since this player has classical side-informationW about the seed V , we need
an extra step to handle it. Lemma A.3 tells us that from Eq. (9) and because
by Theorem 4.5, C is a quantum (k + log 1/ε, 3
√
ε)-strong extractor, we must
have either for some w, Hmin(X |GEW = w) < k + log 1/ε and hence
Hmin (X |E) = Hmin (X |EW = w)
≤ Hmin (X |GEW = w) +H0(G) < k + rm+ log 1/ε,
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or Hmin(V |W ) < s+ log 13√ε , from which we obtain using Lemma B.1
Hmin (Y ) ≤ Hmin (V |W ) +H0(W ) < s+ log 1
3
√
ε
+ d− t.
5 Concrete constructions
Depending on what goal has been set — e.g., maximize the output, minimize the
seed length — different 1-bit extractors and weak designs will be needed. In this
section we give a few examples of what can be done, by taking various classical
extractors and designs, and plugging them into Theorem 4.6 (or Theorem 4.7),
to obtain bounds on the seed size and entropy loss in the presence of quantum
side information.
The results are usually given using the O-notation. This is always meant
with respect to all the free variables, e.g., O(1) is a constant independent of the
input length n, the output length m, and the error ε. Likewise, o(1) goes to 0
for both n and m large.
We first consider the problem of extracting all the min-entropy of the source
in Section 5.1. This was achieved in the classical case by Raz et al. [RRV02], so
we use the same 1-bit extractor and weak design as them.
In Section 5.2 we give a scheme which uses a seed of length d = O(log n), but
can only extract part of the entropy. This is also based on Raz et al. [RRV02]
in the classical case.
In Section 5.3 we combine an extractor and design which are locally com-
putable (from Vadhan [Vad04] and Hartman and Raz [HR03] respectively), to
produce a quantum m-bit extractor, such that each bit of the output depends
on only O(log(m/ε)) bits of the input.
And finally in Section 5.4 we use a 1-bit extractor from Raz [Raz05], which
only requires a weakly random seed, resulting in a quantum m-bit extractor,
which also works with a weakly random seed.
These constructions are summarized in Table 1 on page 5.
5.1 Near optimal entropy loss
To achieve a near optimal entropy loss we need to combine a 1-bit extractor with
near optimal entropy loss and a weak (t, 1)-design. We use the same extractor
and design as Raz et al. [RRV02] to do so.
Lemma 5.1 ( [RRV02, Lemma 17]13). For every t,m ∈ N there exists a weak
(t, 1)-design S1, . . . , Sm ⊂ [d] such that d = t
⌈
t
ln 2
⌉ ⌈log 4m⌉ = O(t2 logm).
Moreover, such a design can be found in time poly(m, d) and space poly(m).
As 1-bit extractor, Raz et al. [RRV02] (and Trevisan [Tre01] too) used the
bits of a list-decodable code. We give the parameters here as Proposition 5.2
and refer to Appendix C for details on the construction and proof.
Proposition 5.2. For any ε > 0 and n ∈ N there exists a (k, ε)-strong extractor
with uniform seed Extn,ε : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1} with t = O(log(n/ε)) and
k = 3 log 1/ε.
13Hartman and Raz [HR03] give a more efficient construction of this lemma, namely in time
poly(logm, t) and space poly(logm+ log t), with the extra minor restriction that m > tlog t.
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Plugging this into Theorem 4.6 we get a quantum extractor with parameters
similar to Raz et al. [RRV02].
Corollary 5.3. Let C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1} be the extractor from Propo-
sition 5.2 with error ε′ = ε
2
9m2 and let S1, . . . , Sm ⊂ [d] be the weak (t, 1)-design
from Lemma 5.1. Then
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
(x, y) 7→ C(x, yS1) · · ·C(x, ySm)
is a quantum-proof (m+8 logm+8 log 1/ε+O(1), ε)-strong extractor with uni-
form seed, with d = O(log2(n/ε) logm).
For ε = poly(1/n) the seed has length d = O(log3 n). The entropy loss
is ∆ = 8 logm + 8 log 1/ε + O(1), which means that the input still has this
much randomness left in it (conditioned on the output). We can extract a bit
more by now applying a second extractor to the input. For this we will use
the extractor by Tomamichel et al [TSSR10], which is a quantum (k′, ε′)-strong
extractor14 with seed length d′ = O(m′ + logn′ + log 1/ε′) and entropy loss
∆′ = 4 log 1/ε′+O(1), where n′ and m′ are the input and output string lengths.
Since we will use it for m′ = 8 logm+4 log 1/ε′+O(1), we immediately get the
following corollary from Lemma A.4.
Corollary 5.4. By applying the extractors from Corollary 5.3 and [TSSR10,
Theorem 10] in succession, we get a new function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d →
{0, 1}m, which is a quantum-proof (m + 4 log 1/ε + O(1), ε)-strong extractor
with uniform seed of length d = O(log2(n/ε) logm).
For ε = poly(1/n) the seed has length d = O(log3 n).
The entropy loss is ∆ = 4 log 1/ε + O(1), which is only a factor 2 times
larger than the optimal entropy loss. By Lemma 3.5 this extractor can produce
m = Hε
′
min(X |E)− 4 log 1/ε−O(1) bits of randomness with an error ε+ 2ε′.
5.2 Seed of logarithmic size
The weak design used in Section 5.1 requires a seed of length d = Θ(t2 logm),
where t is the size of the seed of the 1-bit extractor. Since t cannot be less than
Ω(logn) [RTS00], a scheme using this design will always have d = Ω(log2 n logm).
If we want to use a seed of size d = O(log n) we need a different weak design,
e.g., Lemma 5.5, at the cost of extracting less randomness from the source.
Lemma 5.5 ( [RRV02, Lemma 15]). For every t,m ∈ N and r > 1, there exists
a weak (t, r)-design S1, . . . , Sm ⊂ [d] such that d = t ⌈t/ ln r⌉ = O
(
t2/ log r
)
.
Moreover, such a design can be found in time poly(m, d) and space poly(m).
For the 1-bit extractor we can use the same as in the previous section,
Proposition 5.2.
Plugging this into Theorem 4.6 we get a quantum extractor with logarithmic
seed length.
14 [TSSR10] define quantum-proof extractors a little differently than we do (see Footnote 6
on page 9), but it is not hard to see that their result holds with the same parameters as the
differences are absorbed in the O-notation.
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Corollary 5.6. If for any constant 0 < α ≤ 1, the source has min-entropy
Hmin(X |E) = nα, and the desired error is ε = poly(1/n), then using the extrac-
tor C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1} from Proposition 5.2 with error ε′ = ε29m2 and
the weak (t, r)-design S1, . . . , Sm ⊂ [d] from Lemma 5.5 with r = nγ for any
0 < γ < α, we have that
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
(x, y) 7→ C(x, yS1) · · ·C(x, ySm)
is a quantum-proof (nγm + 8 logm + 8 log 1/ε + O(1), ε)-strong extractor with
uniform seed, with d = O
(
1
γ logn
)
.
Choosing γ to be a constant results in a seed of length d = O(log n). The
output length is m = nα−γ − o(1) = Hmin(X |E)1− γα − o(1). By Lemma 3.5 this
can be increased to m = Hε
′
min(X |E)1−
γ
α − o(1) with an error of ε+ 2ε′.
5.3 Locally computable extractor
Another interesting feature of extractors is locality, that is, the m-bit output
depends only a small subset of the n input bits. This is useful in, e.g., the
bounded storage model (see [Mau92, Lu04, Vad04] for the case of a classical
adversary and [KR11] for a general quantum treatment), where we assume a
huge source of random bits, say n, are available, and the adversary’s storage is
bounded by αn for some constant α < 1. Legitimate parties are also assumed
to have bounded workspace for computation. In particular, for the model to be
meaningful, the bound is stricter than that on the adversary. So to extract a
secret key from the large source of randomness, they need an extractor which
only reads ℓ≪ n bits. An extractor with such a property is called ℓ-local.
Definition 5.7 (ℓ-local extractor). An extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d →
{0, 1}m is ℓ-locally computable (or ℓ-local), if for every r ∈ {0, 1}d, the function
x 7→ Ext(x, r) depends on only ℓ bits of its input, where the bit locations are
determined by r.
Lu [Lu04] modified Trevisan’s scheme [Tre01, RRV02] to use a local list-
decodable code as 1-bit extractor. Vadhan [Vad04] proposes another construc-
tion for local extractors, which is optimal up to constant factors. Both these
constructions have similar parameters in the case of 1-bit extractors.15 We state
the parameters of Vadhan’s construction here and refer the interested reader
to [Lu04] for Lu’s constructions.
Lemma 5.8 ( [Vad04, Theorem 8.5]). For any ε > exp
(−n/2O(log∗ n)), n ∈ N
and constant 0 < γ < 1, there exists an explicit ℓ-local (k, ε)-strong extractor
with uniform seed Extn,ε,γ : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1} with t = O(log(n/ε)),
k = γn and ℓ = O(log 1/ε).
Since we assume that the available memory is limited, we also want the
construction of the weak design to be particularly efficient. For this we can use
a construction by Hartman and Raz [HR03].
15If the extractor is used to extract m-bits, then Vadhan’s scheme reads less input bits and
uses a shorter seed than Lu’s.
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Lemma 5.9 ( [HR03, Theorem 3]). For every m, t ∈ N, such that m = Ω(tlog t),
and constant r > 1, there exists an explicit weak (t, r)-design S1, . . . , Sm ⊂ [d],
where d = O(t2). Such a design can be found in time poly(logm, t) and space
poly(logm+ log t).
Remark 5.10. For the extractor from Lemma 5.8 and an error ε = poly(1/n),
this design requires m = Ω
(
(logn)log log n
)
. If we are interested in a smaller m,
saym = poly(logn), then we can use the weak design from Lemma 5.5 with r =
nγ . This construction would require time and space poly(logn) = poly(log 1/ε).
The resulting seed would have length only O(log n) instead of O(log2 n).
Plugging these constructions into Theorem 4.6 we get a quantum local ex-
tractor.
Corollary 5.11. If for any constant 0 < α ≤ 1, the source has min-entropy
Hmin(X |E) = αn, then using the weak (t, r)-design S1, . . . , Sm ⊂ [d] from
Lemma 5.9 for any constant r > 1, and the extractor C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t →
{0, 1} from Lemma 5.8 with error ε′ = ε29m2 and any constant γ < α, we have
that
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
(x, y) 7→ C(x, yS1) · · ·C(x, ySm)
is a quantum-proof ℓ-local (γn+rm+2 logm+2 log 1/ε+O(1), ε)-strong extractor
with uniform seed, with d = O(log2(n/ε)) and ℓ = O(m log(m/ε)). Furthermore,
each bit of the output depends on only O(log(m/ε)) bits of the input.
With these parameters the extractor can produce up to m = (α − γ)n/r −
O(log 1/ε) = (Hmin(X |E)−γn)/r−O(log 1/ε) bits of randomness, with an error
of ε = poly(1/n). By Lemma 3.5 this can be increased to m = (Hε
′
min(X |E) −
γn)/r −O(log 1/ε) with an error of ε+ 2ε′.
5.4 Weak random seed
Extractors with weak random seeds typically require the seed to have a min-
entropy linear in its length. Theorem 4.7 says that the difference between the
length and the min-entropy of the seed needed in Trevisan’s extractor is roughly
the same as the difference between the length and min-entropy of the seed of
the underlying 1-bit extractor. So we will describe in detail how to modify the
construction from Section 5.2 to use a weakly random seed. As that extractor
uses a seed of length O(log n), this new construction allows us to preserve the
linear loss in the min-entropy of the seed. Any other version of Trevisan’s
extractor can be modified in the same way to use a weakly random seed, albeit
with weaker parameters.
We will use a result by Raz [Raz05], which shows how to transform any
extractor which needs a uniform seed into one which can work with a weakly
random seed.
Lemma 5.12 ( [Raz05, Theorem 4]). For any (k, ε)-strong extractor Ext :
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m with uniform seed, there exists a (k, 2ε)-strong ex-
tractor Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}t′ → {0, 1}m requiring only a seed with min-entropy
Hmin(Y ) ≥
(
1
2 + β
)
t′, where t′ = 8t/β.
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By applying this lemma to the 1-bit extractor given in Proposition 5.2, we
obtain the following 1-bit extractor.
Corollary 5.13. For any ε > 0 and n ∈ N there exists a (k, ε)-strong extractor
Extn,ε : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1} requiring a seed with min-entropy
(
1
2 + β
)
d,
where d = O( 1β log(n/ε)) and k = 3 log 1/ε+ 3.
Plugging this and the weak design from Lemma 5.5 in Theorem 4.7, we get
the following extractor with weak random seed.
Corollary 5.14. Let α > 0 be a constant such that the source has min-entropy
Hmin(X |E) = nα, and the desired error is ε = poly(1/n). Using the extractor
C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1} from Corollary 5.13 with error ε′ = ε29m2 and
the weak (t, r)-design S1, . . . , Sm ⊂ [d] from Lemma 5.5 with r = nγ for any
0 < γ < α, we have that
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
(x, y) 7→ C(x, yS1) · · ·C(x, ySm)
is a quantum-proof (nγm + 8 logm + 8 log 1/ε + O(1), ε)-strong extractor with
an s-bit weak random seed, where the seed has length d = O
(
1
β2γ logn
)
and
min-entropy s =
(
1− 12−βc
)
d, for some constant c.16
Choosing β and γ to be constants results in a seed of length d = O(log n)
with a possible entropy-loss linear in d. The output length is the same as in
Section 5.2, m = nα−γ − o(1) = Hmin(X |E)1− γα − o(1).
If we are interested in extracting all the min-entropy of the source, we can
combine Lemma 5.12 with the extractor from Section 5.1. This results in a new
extractor with seed length d = O(log3 n) and seed min-entropy s = d−O( 3
√
d).
6 Outlook
There exist many results modifying and improving Trevisan’s extractor. We
briefly describe a few of them here, and refer to [Sha02] for a more extensive
review.
Some of these constructions still follow the “design and 1-bit extractor”
pattern — hence our work implies that they are immediately quantum-proof
with roughly the same parameters — e.g., the work of Raz et al. [RRV02]
and Lu [Lu04], which were mentioned in Section 5 and correspond to mod-
ifications of the design and 1-bit extractor respectively. Other results such
as [RRV02,TSZS06,SU05] replace the binary list-decoding codes with multivari-
ate codes over a field F . Raz et al. [RRV02] use this technique to reduce the
dependence of the seed on the error from O(log2 1/ε) to O(log 1/ε). Ta-Shma
et al. [TSZS06] and Shaltiel and Umans [SU05] reduce the size of the seed to
d ≤ 2 logn in several constructions with different parameters for the min-entropy.
In these constructions the connection to 1-bit extractors is not clear anymore,
and it is therefore not guaranteed that these extractors are quantum-proof.
16If we work out the exact constant, we find that c ≈ d/t ≈
8(1+4a)
βγ ln 2
, for ε = n−a.
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Raz et al. [RRV02] extract a little more randomness than we do in Section 5.1.
They achieve this by composing (in the sense described in Appendix A.2) the
scheme of Corollary 5.3 with an extractor by Srinivasan and Zuckerman [SZ99],
which has an optimal entropy loss of ∆ = 2 log 1/ε+ O(1). In the presence of
quantum side information this extractor has been proven to have an entropy
loss of ∆ = 4 log 1/ε + O(1) in [TSSR10], hence our slightly weaker result in
Corollary 5.4, which can possibly be improved.
Impagliazzo et al. [ISW00] and then Ta-Shma et al. [TSUZ01] modify Tre-
visan’s extractor to work for a sub-polynomial entropy source, still using a seed
of size d = O(log n). Ta-Shma et al. [TSUZ01] achieve a construction which can
extract all the min-entropy k of the source with such a seed length, for some
k = o(n). While it is unclear whether these modifications preserve the “design
and 1-bit extractor” structure, it is an interesting open problem to analyze them
in the context of quantum side information.
Another research direction consists in making these constructions practically
implementable. Whether the extractor is used for privacy amplification [BBR88,
BBCM95], generating true randomness [XQM+11], or for randomness recy-
cling [IZ89], the extractor has to have a running time which makes it useful.
This does not seem to be the case of Trevisan’s construction [Sol10]. An impor-
tant open problem is thus to find variations which are practical to execute.
It is also of great interest to study quantum-proof two-source extractors, that
is, extractors which can be applied to two independent sources, each of which is
correlated to independent quantum side information. This has so far only been
studied by Roy and Kempe [KK10], and we refer to their work for more details
and open problems.
Appendices
A More on extractors
A.1 Weak random seed
In Section 3.1 we defined extractors as functions which take a uniformly random
seed. This is the most common way of defining them, but not a necessary
condition. Instead we can consider extractors which use a seed which is only
weakly random, but with bounded min-entropy. We extend Definition 3.1 this
way.
Definition A.1 (strong extractor with weak random seed [Raz05]). A function
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a (k, ε)-strong extractor with an s-bit seed,
if for all distributions X with Hmin(X) ≥ k and any seed Y independent from
X with Hmin(Y ) ≥ s, we have
1
2
∥∥ρExt(X,Y )Y − ρUm ⊗ ρY ∥∥tr ≤ ε,
where ρUm is the fully mixed state on a system of dimension 2
m.
If quantum side information about the input is present in a system E, then
as before, we require the seed and the output to be independent from that
side-information.
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Definition A.2 (quantum-proof strong extractor with weak random seed). A
function Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a quantum-proof (k, ε)-strong extrac-
tor with an s-bit seed, if for all states ρXE classical on X with Hmin(X |E)ρ ≥ k,
and for any seed Y independent from XE with Hmin(Y ) ≥ s, we have
1
2
∥∥ρExt(X,Y )Y E − ρUm ⊗ ρY ⊗ ρE∥∥tr ≤ ε,
where ρUm is the fully mixed state on a system of dimension 2
m.
Lemma 3.3 says that any extractor will work with roughly the same param-
eters when classical side information about the input X is present. The same
holds in the case of classical side information Z about the seed Y .
Lemma A.3. Let Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a quantum-proof (k, ε)-
strong extractor with an s-bit seed. Then for any classical X, Y and Z, and
quantum E, such that XE and Y are independent, Y ↔ Z ↔ E form a Markov
chain,17 Hmin(Y |Z) ≥ s+ log 1/ε, and for all z ∈ Z, Hmin(X |EZ = z) ≥ k, we
have
1
2
∥∥ρExt(X,Y )Y ZE − ρU ⊗ ρY ZE∥∥tr ≤ 2ε.
Proof. For any two classical systems Y and Z, we have
2−Hmin(Y |Z) = E
z←Z
[
2−Hmin(Y |Z=z)
]
,
so by Markov’s inequality,
Pr
z←Z
[Hmin (Y |Z = z) ≤ Hmin (Y |Z)− log 1/ε] ≤ ε.
And since Y ↔ Z ↔ E form a Markov chain, we have for all z ∈ Z,
ρY E|Z=z = ρY |Z=z ⊗ ρE|Z=z.
Hence
1
2
∥∥ρExt(X,Y )Y EZ − ρU ⊗ ρY EZ∥∥tr
=
1
2
∑
z∈Z
PZ(z)
∥∥ρExt(X,Y )Y E|Z=z − ρU ⊗ ρY E|Z=z∥∥tr
=
1
2
∑
z∈Z
PZ(z)
∥∥ρExt(X,Y )Y E|Z=z − ρU ⊗ ρY |Z=z ⊗ ρE|Z=z∥∥tr ≤ 2ε.
The case of quantum side information correlated to both the input and the
seed is out of the scope of this work.
A.2 Composing extractors
If an extractor does not have optimal entropy loss, a useful approach to extract
more entropy is to apply a second extractor to the original input, to extract the
17A ccq state ρXYE forms a Markov chain X ↔ Y ↔ E if it can be expressed as ρXYE =∑
x,y PXY (x, y)|x, y〉〈x, y| ⊗ ρ
y
E
.
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randomness that remains when the output of the first extractor is known. This
was first proposed in the classical case by Wigderson and Zuckerman [WZ99],
and improved by Raz et al. [RRV02]. Ko¨nig and Terhal [KT08] gave the first
quantum version for composing m times quantum 1-bit extractors. We slightly
generalize the result of Ko¨nig and Terhal [KT08] to the composition of arbitrary
quantum extractors.
Lemma A.4. Let Ext1 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}m1 and Ext2 : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}m2 be quantum-proof (k, ε1)- and (k−m1, ε2)-strong extractors.
Then the composition of the two, namely
Ext3 :{0, 1}n × {0, 1}d1 × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}m1 × {0, 1}m2
(x, y1, y2) 7→ (Ext1(x, y1),Ext2(x, y2)),
is a quantum-proof (k, ε1 + ε2)-strong extractor.
Proof. We need to show that for any state ρXE with Hmin(X |E) ≥ k,
1
2
∥∥ρExt1(X,Y1) Ext2(X,Y2)Y1Y2E − ρU1 ⊗ ρU2 ⊗ ρY1 ⊗ ρY2 ⊗ ρE∥∥tr ≤ ε1 + ε2. (10)
The left-hand side of Eq. (10) can be upper-bounded by
1
2
∥∥ρExt1(X,Y1)Y1E ⊗ ρU2 ⊗ ρY2 − ρU1 ⊗ ρY1 ⊗ ρE ⊗ ρU2 ⊗ ρY2∥∥tr
+
1
2
∥∥ρExt2(X,Y2)Y2 Ext1(X,Y1)Y1E − ρU2 ⊗ ρY2 ⊗ ρExt1(X,Y1)Y1E∥∥tr . (11)
By the definition of Ext1 the first term in Eq. (11) is upper-bounded by ε1. For
the second term we use Lemma B.3 and get
Hmin (X |Ext1(X,Y1)Y1E) ≥ Hmin (X |Y1E)−H0(Ext1(X,Y1))
= Hmin (X |E)−H0(Ext1(X,Y1)) ≥ k −m1.
By the definition of Ext2 the second term in Eq. (11) can then be upper-bounded
by ε2.
B Technical lemmas
B.1 Min-entropy chain rules
We use the following “chain-rule type” statement about the min-entropy. The
proofs for the two first can be found in [Ren05].
Lemma B.1 ( [Ren05, Lemma 3.1.10]). For any state ρABC ,
Hmin (A|BC) ≥ Hmin (AC|B) −H0(C),
where H0(C) = log rank(ρC).
Lemma B.2 ( [Ren05, Lemma 3.1.9]). For any state ρABZ classical on Z,
Hmin (AZ|B) ≥ Hmin (A|B) .
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Lemma B.3. For any state ρABZ classical on Z,
Hmin (A|BZ) ≥ Hmin (A|B)−H0(Z),
where H0(Z) = log rank(ρZ).
Proof. Immediate by combining Lemma B.1 and Lemma B.2.
B.2 Reduction step
To show that a player who can distinguish the output of ExtC (defined in
Definition 4.2 on page 12) from uniform can also guess the output of the extrac-
tor C, we first show that such a player can guess one of the bits of the output
of ExtC given some extra classical information. This is a quantum version of a
result by Yao [Yao82].
Lemma B.4. Let ρZB be a cq-state, where Z is a random variable on m-bit
strings. If ‖ρZB − ρUm ⊗ ρB‖tr > ε, then there exists an i ∈ [m] such that∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
z∈Z
zi=0
pz
∣∣z[i−1]〉〈z[i−1]∣∣⊗ ρzB −∑
z∈Z
zi=1
pz
∣∣z[i−1]〉〈z[i−1]∣∣⊗ ρzB
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
>
ε
m
. (12)
Using the fact that for any binary random variable X and quantum sys-
tem Q with ρXQ =
∑
i=0,1 pi|i〉〈i| ⊗ ρiQ, the following equality holds: ‖ρXQ −
ρU1 ⊗ ρQ‖tr = ‖p0ρ0Q − p1ρ1Q‖tr, Eq. (12) can be rewritten as ‖ρZi[i−1]B − ρU1 ⊗
ρZ[i−1]B‖tr > εm . Lemma B.4 can thus be interpreted as saying that if a player
holding B can distinguish Z from uniform with probability greater than ε, then
there exists a bit i ∈ [m] such that when given the previous i − 1 bits of Z, he
can distinguish the ith bit of Z from uniform with probability greater than εm .
Proof. The proof uses a hybrid argument. Let
σi =
∑
z∈Z
r∈{0,1}m
pz
2m
∣∣z[i], r{i+1,...,m}〉〈z[i], r{i+1,...,m}∣∣⊗ ρzB.
Then
ε < ‖ρZB − ρUm ⊗ ρB‖tr
= ‖σm − σ0‖tr
≤
m∑
i=1
‖σi − σi−1‖tr
≤ mmax
i
‖σi − σi−1‖tr .
By rearranging ‖σi − σi−1‖tr we get the lhs of Eq. (12).
We now need to bound the size of this extra information, the “previous i− 1
bits”, and show that when averaging over all the seeds of ExtC , we average
over all the seeds of C, which means that guessing a bit of the output of ExtC
corresponds to distinguishing the output of C from uniform. For the reader’s
convenience we now restate Proposition 4.4 and give its proof.
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Proposition B.5. [Proposition 4.4] Let X be a classical random variable cor-
related to some quantum system E, let Y be a (not necessarily uniform) seed,
independent from XE, and let∥∥ρExtC(X,Y )E − ρUm ⊗ ρY ⊗ ρE∥∥tr > ε, (13)
where ExtC is the extractor from Definition 4.2. Then there exists a fixed parti-
tion of the seed Y in two substrings V and W , and a classical random variable
G, such that G has size H0(G) ≤ rm, where r is one of the parameters of the
weak design (Definition 4.1), V ↔W ↔ G form a Markov chain, and
∥∥ρC(X,V )VWGE − ρU1 ⊗ ρVWGE∥∥tr > εm. (14)
Proof. We apply Lemma B.4 to Eq. (13) and get that there exists an i ∈ [m]
such that∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
x,y
C(x,ySi)=0
pxqy
∣∣C(x, yS1) · · ·C(x, ySi−1 ), y〉〈C(x, yS1) · · ·C(x, ySi−1), y∣∣⊗ ρx
−
∑
x,y
C(x,ySi)=1
pxqy
∣∣C(x, yS1) · · ·C(x, ySi−1), y〉〈C(x, yS1) · · ·C(x, ySi−1), y∣∣⊗ ρx
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
>
ε
m
, (15)
where {px}x∈X and {qy}y∈Y are the probability distributions of X and Y re-
spectively.
We split y ∈ {0, 1}d in two strings of t = |Si| and d − t bits, and write
v := ySi and w := y[d]\Si. To simplify the notation, we set g(w, x, j, v) :=
C(x, ySj ). Fix w, x and j, and consider the function g(w, x, j, ·) : {0, 1}t →
{0, 1}. This function only depends on |Sj ∩ Si| bits of v. So to describe this
function we need a string of at most 2|Sj∩Si| bits. And to describe gw,x(·) :=
g(w, x, 1, ·) · · · g(w, x, i−1, ·), which is the concatenation of the bits of g(w, x, j, ·)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1, we need a string of length at most∑i−1j=1 2|Sj∩Si|. So a system
G containing a description of gw,x has size at most H0(G) ≤
∑i−1
j=1 2
|Sj∩Si|. We
now rewrite Eq. (15) as
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
x,v,w
C(x,v)=0
pxqv,w|gw,x(v), v, w〉〈gw,x(v), v, w| ⊗ ρx
−
∑
x,v,w
C(x,v)=1
pxqv,w|gw,x(v), v, w〉〈gw,x(v), v, w| ⊗ ρx
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
>
ε
m
.
By providing a complete description of gw,x instead of its value at the point
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v, we can only increase the trace distance, hence∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
x,v,w
C(x,v)=0
pxqv,w|gw,x, v, w〉〈gw,x, v, w| ⊗ ρx
−
∑
x,v,w
C(x,v)=1
pxqv,w|gw,x, v, w〉〈gw,x, v, w| ⊗ ρx
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
>
ε
m
.
By rearranging this a little more we finally get∥∥ρC(X,V )VWGE − ρU1 ⊗ ρVWGE∥∥tr > εm,
where G is a classical system of size H0(G) ≤
∑i−1
j=1 2
|Sj∩Si|, and V ↔ W ↔ G
form a Markov chain. By the definition of weak designs, we have for all i ∈ [m],∑i−1
j=1 2
|Sj∩Si| ≤ rm for some r ≥ 1. So H0(G) ≤ rm.
C List-decodable codes are one-bit extractors
A standard error correcting code guarantees that if the error is small, any string
can be uniquely decoded. A list-decodable code guarantees that for a larger
(but bounded) error, any string can be decoded to a list of possible messages.
Definition C.1 (list-decodable code [Sud00]). A code C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n¯ is
said to be (ε, L)-list-decodable if every Hamming ball of relative radius 1/2− ε
in {0, 1}n¯ contains at most L codewords.
Neither Trevisan [Tre01] nor Raz et al. [RRV02] state it explicitly, but both
papers contain an implicit proof that if C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n¯ is a (ε, L)-list-
decodable code, then
Ext : {0, 1}n × [n¯]→ {0, 1}
(x, y) 7→ C(x)y ,
is a (logL+log 1/2ε, 2ε)-strong extractor (according to Definition 3.1). We have
rewritten their proof as Theorem C.3 for completeness.18
There exist list-decodable codes with following parameters.
Lemma C.2. For every n ∈ N and δ > 0 there is a code Cn,δ : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n¯, which is (δ, 1/δ2)-list-decodable, with n¯ = poly(n, 1/δ). Furthermore,
Cn,δ can be evaluated in time poly(n, 1/δ) and n¯ can be assumed to be a power
of 2.
For example, Guruswami et al. [GHSZ02] combine a Reed-Solomon code
with a Hadamard code, obtaining such a list-decodable code with n¯ = O(n/δ4).
Such codes require all bits of the input x to be read to compute any single
bit C(x)i of the output. If we are interested in so-called local codes, we can use
a construction by Lu [Lu04, Corollary 1].
18A slightly more general proof, that approximate list-decodable codes are 1-bit extractors
can be found in [DV10, Claim 3.7].
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Theorem C.3. Let C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n¯ be an (ε, L)-list-decodable code. Then
the function
C′ : {0, 1}n × [n¯]→ {0, 1}
(x, y) 7→ C(x)y ,
is a (logL+ log 1/2ε, 2ε)-strong extractor.19
To prove this theorem we first show that a player who can distinguish the
bit of C′(X,Y ) from uniform can construct a string α which is close to C(X)
on average (over X). Then using the error correcting properties of the code C,
he can reconstruct X . Hence a player who can break the extractor must have
low min-entropy about X .
Lemma C.4. Let X and Y be two independent random variables with alphabets
{0, 1}n and [n] respectively. Let Y be uniformly distributed and X be distributed
such that 12 |XY ◦ Y − U1 ◦ Y | > δ, where U1 is uniformly distributed on {0, 1}.
Then there exists a string α ∈ {0, 1}n with
Pr
[
d(X,α) ≤ 1
2
− δ
2
]
> δ,
where d(·, ·) is the relative Hamming distance.
Proof. Define α ∈ {0, 1}n to be the concatenation of the most probable bits of
X , i.e., αy := argmaxb PXy (b), where PXy (b) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
xy=b
PX(x).
The average relative Hamming distance between X and α is
∑
x∈{0,1}n
PX(x)d(x, α) =
1
n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
PX(x)
n∑
y=1
|xy − αy|
=
1
n
∑
x,y
xy 6=αy
PX(x) = 1− 1
n
n∑
y=1
PX(αy).
And since 12 |XY ◦Y −U1◦Y | > δ is equivalent to 1n
∑n
y=1maxb∈{0,1} PXy (b) >
1
2 + δ, we have ∑
x∈{0,1}n
PX(x)d(x, α) <
1
2
− δ. (16)
We now wish to lower bound the probability that the relative Hamming
distance is less than 12 − δ2 . Let B := {x : d(x, α) ≤ 12 − δ2} be the set of
values x ∈ {0, 1}n meeting this requirement. Then the weight of B, w(B) :=∑
x∈B PX(x), is the quantity we wish to lower bound. It is at its minimum if all
x ∈ B have Hamming distance d(x, α) = 0. In which case the average Hamming
distance is ∑
x∈{0,1}n
PX(x)d (x, α) > (1− w(B))
(
1
2
− δ
2
)
. (17)
19This theorem still holds in the presence of classical side information with exactly the same
parameters.
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Combining Eqs. (16) and (17) we get
w(B) >
δ
1− δ ≥ δ.
We are now ready to prove Theorem C.3.
Proof of Theorem C.3. We will show that if it is possible to distinguish C′(X,Y )
from uniform with probability at least 2ε, then X must have min-entropy
Hmin(X) < logL+ log 1/2ε.
If 12 |C′(X,Y ) ◦ Y − U1 ◦ Y | > 2ε, then by Lemma C.4 we know that there
exists an α ∈ {0, 1}n¯ such that
Pr
[
d (C(X), α) ≤ 1
2
− ε
]
> 2ε,
where d(·, ·) is the relative Hamming distance.
This means that with probability at least 2ε, X takes values x such that
the relative Hamming distance d(C(x), α) ≤ 12 − ε. So for these values of X , if
we choose one of the codewords in the Hamming ball of relative radius 12 − ε
around α uniformly at random as our guess for x, we will have chosen correctly
with probability at least 1/L, since the Hamming ball contains at most L code
words. The total probability of guessing X is then at least 2ε/L.
Hence by Eq. (3), Hmin(X) < logL+ log 1/2ε.
References
[ANTSV99] Andris Ambainis, Ashwin Nayak, Ammon Ta-Shma, and Umesh
Vazirani. Dense quantum coding and a lower bound for 1-
way quantum automata. In Proceedings of the 31st symposium
on theory of computing, STOC ’99, pages 376–383. ACM, 1999.
[doi:10.1145/301250.301347, arXiv:quant-ph/9804043].
[BATS12] Avraham Ben-Aroya and Amnon Ta-Shma. Better short-seed
quantum-proof extractors. Theoretical Computer Science, 419:17–
25, 2012. [doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2011.11.036, arXiv:1004.3737].
[BBCM95] Charles H. Bennett, Gilles Brassard, Claude Cre´peau, and Ueli
Maurer. Generalized privacy amplification. IEEE Transac-
tion on Information Theory, 41(6):1915–1923, November 1995.
[doi:10.1109/18.476316].
[BBR88] Charles H. Bennett, Gilles Brassard, and Jean-Marc Robert. Pri-
vacy amplification by public discussion. SIAM Journal on Com-
puting, 17(2):210–229, 1988. [doi:10.1137/0217014].
[DV10] Anindya De and Thomas Vidick. Near-optimal extractors
against quantum storage. In Proceedings of the 42nd sympo-
sium on theory of computing, STOC ’10, pages 161–170, 2010.
[doi:10.1145/1806689.1806713, arXiv:0911.4680].
27
[GHSZ02] Venkatesan Guruswami, Johan H˚astad, Madhu Sudan, and David
Zuckerman. Combinatorial bounds for list decoding. IEEE Trans-
actions on Information Theory, 48(5):1021–1034, 2002.
[GKK+07] Dmitry Gavinsky, Julia Kempe, Iordanis Kerenidis, Ran Raz,
and Ronald de Wolf. Exponential separations for one-way
quantum communication complexity, with applications to cryp-
tography. In Proceedings of the 39th symposium on the-
ory of computing, STOC ’07, pages 516–525. ACM, 2007.
[doi:10.1145/1250790.1250866, arXiv:quant-ph/0611209].
[HR03] Tzvika Hartman and Ran Raz. On the distribution of the number of
roots of polynomials and explicit weak designs. Random Structures
and Algorithms, 23(3):235–263, 2003. [doi:10.1002/rsa.10095].
[ISW00] Russell Impagliazzo, Ronen Shaltiel, and Avi Wigderson. Ex-
tractors and pseudo-random generators with optimal seed length.
In Proceedings of the 32nd symposium on theory of computing,
STOC ’00, pages 1–10. ACM, 2000. [doi:10.1145/335305.335306].
[IZ89] Russell Impagliazzo and David Zuckerman. How to recycle random
bits. In Proceedings of the 30th Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, FOCS ’89, pages 248–253, 1989.
[KK10] Roy Kasher and Julia Kempe. Two-source extractors secure against
quantum adversaries. In Proceedings of the international confer-
ence on Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Opti-
mization, APPROX-RANDOM ’10, pages 656–669. Springer, 2010.
[doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15369-3 49, arXiv:1005.0512].
[KR11] Robert Ko¨nig and Renato Renner. Sampling of min-entropy rela-
tive to quantum knowledge. IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, 57(7):4760–4787, 2011. [doi:10.1109/TIT.2011.2146730,
arXiv:0712.4291].
[KRS09] Robert Ko¨nig, Renato Renner, and Christian Schaffner. The oper-
ational meaning of min- and max-entropy. IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, 55(9):4337–4347, 2009. [arXiv:0807.1338].
[KT08] Robert Ko¨nig and Barbara M. Terhal. The bounded-storage
model in the presence of a quantum adversary. IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, 54(2):749–762, Feb 2008.
[doi:10.1109/TIT.2007.913245, arXiv:quant-ph/0608101].
[Lu04] Chi-Jen Lu. Encryption against storage-bounded adversaries from
on-line strong extractors. Journal of Cryptology, 17(1):27–42, 2004.
[doi:10.1007/s00145-003-0217-1].
[Mau92] Ueli M. Maurer. Conditionally-perfect secrecy and a provably-
secure randomized cipher. Journal of Cryptology, 5(1):53–66, 1992.
[NW94] Noam Nisan and Avi Wigderson. Hardness vs randomness. Jour-
nal of Computer and System Sciences, 49(2):149 – 167, 1994.
[doi:10.1016/S0022-0000(05)80043-1].
28
[NZ96] Noam Nisan and David Zuckerman. Randomness is linear in
space. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 52(1):43–
52, 1996. A preliminary version appeared at STOC ’93.
[doi:10.1006/jcss.1996.0004].
[Raz05] Ran Raz. Extractors with weak random seeds. In Proceedings of the
37th symposium on Theory of computing, STOC ’05, pages 11–20.
ACM, 2005. [doi:10.1145/1060590.1060593].
[Ren05] Renato Renner. Security of Quantum Key Distribution. PhD the-
sis, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, September 2005.
[arXiv:quant-ph/0512258].
[RRV02] Ran Raz, Omer Reingold, and Salil Vadhan. Extracting all
the randomness and reducing the error in Trevisan’s extractors.
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 65(1):97–128, 2002.
[doi:10.1006/jcss.2002.1824].
[RTS00] Jaikumar Radhakrishnan and Amnon Ta-Shma. Bounds
for dispersers, extractors, and depth-two superconcentrators.
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 13(1):2–24, 2000.
[doi:10.1137/S0895480197329508].
[Sha02] Ronen Shaltiel. Recent developments in explicit constructions of
extractors. Bulletin of the European Association for Theoretical
Computer Science, 77:67–95, June 2002.
[Sol10] Raffaele Solca`. Efficient simulation of random quantum states and
operators. Master’s thesis, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology,
Zurich, 2010.
[SU05] Ronen Shaltiel and Christopher Umans. Simple extractors for all
min-entropies and a new pseudorandom generator. Journal of the
ACM, 52(2):172–216, 2005. [doi:10.1145/1059513.1059516].
[Sud00] Madhu Sudan. List decoding: algorithms and ap-
plications. SIGACT News, 31:16–27, March 2000.
[doi:10.1145/346048.346049].
[SZ99] Aravind Srinivasan and David Zuckerman. Computing with very
weak random sources. SIAM Journal on Computing, 28(4):1433–
1459, 1999. [doi:10.1137/S009753979630091X].
[TCR10] Marco Tomamichel, Roger Colbeck, and Renato Renner.
Duality between smooth min- and max-entropies. IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, 56(9):4674–4681, 2010.
[doi:10.1109/TIT.2010.2054130, arXiv:0907.5238].
[Tre01] Luca Trevisan. Extractors and pseudorandom generators. Journal
of the ACM, 48(4):860–879, 2001. [doi:10.1145/502090.502099].
[TS09] Amnon Ta-Shma. Short seed extractors against quantum
storage. In Proceedings of the 41st symposium on the-
ory of computing, STOC ’09, pages 401–408. ACM, 2009.
[doi:10.1145/1536414.1536470, arXiv:0808.1994].
29
[TSSR10] Marco Tomamichel, Christian Schaffner, Adam Smith, and
Renato Renner. Leftover hashing against quantum side in-
formation. In Proceedings of 2010 international symposium
on information theory, ISIT, pages 2703–2707. IEEE, 2010.
[doi:10.1109/ISIT.2010.5513652, arXiv:1002.2436].
[TSUZ01] Amnon Ta-Shma, Christopher Umans, and David Zuckerman. Loss-
less condensers, unbalanced expanders, and extractors. In Proceed-
ings of the 33rd symposium on theory of computing, STOC ’01,
pages 143–152. ACM, 2001. [doi:10.1145/380752.380790].
[TSZS06] Amnon Ta-Shma, David Zuckerman, and Shmuel Safra. Extractors
from reed-muller codes. Journal of Computer and System Sciences,
72(5):786–812, 2006. [doi:10.1016/j.jcss.2005.05.010].
[Vad04] Salil P. Vadhan. Constructing locally computable extractors and
cryptosystems in the bounded-storage model. Journal of Cryptol-
ogy, 17(1):43–77, 2004. [doi:10.1007/s00145-003-0237-x].
[WZ99] Avi Wigderson and David Zuckerman. Expanders that beat the
eigenvalue bound: Explicit construction and applications. Combi-
natorica, 19(1):125–138, 1999. [doi:10.1007/s004930050049].
[XQM+11] Feihu Xu, Bing Qi, Xiongfeng Ma, He Xu, Haoxuan Zheng, and Hoi-
Kwong Lo. An ultrafast quantum random number generator based
on quantum phase fluctuations. eprint, 2011. [arXiv:1109.0643].
[Yao82] Andrew Chi-Chih Yao. Theory and applications of trapdoor func-
tions (extended abstract). In Proceedings of the 23rd Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS ’82, pages 80–91. IEEE,
1982.
[Zuc90] David Zuckerman. General weak random sources. In Pro-
ceedings of the 31st Symposium on Foundations of Com-
puter Science, FOCS ’90, pages 534–543. IEEE, 1990.
[doi:10.1109/FSCS.1990.89574].
30
